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Abstract. The main focus of this paper is the mind-body problem in its relati-
on to the doctrine of ‘neutral monism’ and the question who can be considered
its proponents. According to Bertrand Russell, these are Ernst Mach, William
James, and John Dewey (to name a few). This paper aims to clarify whether
Russell himself was right in his conclusions or not. At first, I start with the
clarification of the relation between ‘neutral monism’ and ‘dual-aspect theory’.
Secondly, I analyze the ‘big three’ of the neutral monism: Mach, James and
Russell. My starting-point here is Russell’s very understanding of Mach and
James positions. In the end, it appears that neither Mach, nor James as well
as Dewey can be considered as neutral monists. It was rather Russell’s mi-
sunderstanding of the both James’ radical empiricism and Mach’s analysis of
sensations, which led him to the creation of his own original version of ‘neutral
monism’ (or ‘Russelian monism’).
Keywords: mind-body problem, neutral monism, dual-aspect
theory, Russell, Mach, James, Dewey.
To explain is to employ one thing to elucidate, clear, shed
light upon, put in better order, because in wider context,
another thing [5, p. 232].
1 Introduction
The mind-body problem is a problem of the relation of the mind to
the body: how is that possible that immaterial mind interacts with the
material body? And do they really interact? And what is the mind as
versus the body? These are the age-long questions, which struck minds of
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many philosophers throughout the centuries. Traditionally, the mind-body
problem and its clear articulation are referenced to Rene Descartes, who,
in his magnum opus «Meditations of the First Philosophy» addressed this
problem directly.
Descartes’ decision of how to treat this problem is traditionally called
dualism, or, if to be more precise, the substance dualism: Descartes thought
of mind and body as substances, which cannot interact with each other
directly, but which, nevertheless, form the union of the mind and body
through the ‘pineal gland’. That being said, Descartes was intuitively tryi-
ng to show that we cannot explain mental things from physical things,
which in the contemporary philosophy of mind is called the knowledge
argument : an intuition that one cannot get mental descriptions through
the physical descriptions only [8]1. Baruch Spinoza, in his Ethics, was tryi-
ng to overcome the Cartesian substance dualism and proposed that there
was only one substance, namely, God or Nature, and mind and body were
just two aspects (or attributes) of this substance. In the contemporary
philosophy of mind, this theory is called the ‘double-aspect theory’2.
1According to the classical argument, there is a brilliant scientist, Mary, who knows
everything about colors, but lives in the black-and-white room. While she knows
everything about colors scientifically, she never saw a single color herself. So, what
will happen when it comes the day for her to really see, say, some red tomato, for the
first time? Will she wonder like: «Oh, so that’s how it looks like!», or she would say
something like «I knew it to be precisely like this!».
According to the non-reductionist interpretation of the argument, and if to speak
in the terms of James and Dewey’s crucial distinction between the primary experience
and the secondary experience, Mary, while still being in a black-and-white room, is not
able to understand what it is like to see a red tomato from the point of view of the
primary experience (a simple qualitative that), which in Analytic notions is called as
what-it-is-likeness (there is something it is like to be a conscious organism, having some
qualitative character (qualia)).
Physicalist attacks on this argument can be reduced to the statement that all Mary’s
‘knowledge’ is enough to understand in terms of the secondary experience (i.e., purely
reflective and scientific knowledge) only. Physicalists simply reduce the primary experi-
ence level to the secondary one, as opposed to the non-reductionists, arguments of
whom put a strong accent on that before the things are really known reflectively, they
are ‘known’ qualitatively. Or, if to express it in Dewey’s fashion, «things are had, before
they are known».
2I think, Spinoza’s understanding was closer (from the epistemological point of view)
to the double-aspect theory: we, as human beings, can epistemologically grasp only two
attributes (or aspects) of God or Nature, i.e., mental and physical. But, in that God is
«a being absolutely infinite» [1, p. 85], it doesn’t mean we have to be restricted to these
two (from the ontological standpoint). For example, in his 1974 famous paper «What
is it like to be a bat?» [18] Thomas Nagel argued that we don’t actually know what
it is like to be a bat. The latter possesses sonar. We don’t. Thus, we just don’t know
how bat is processing information in order to survive in the environment and, of course,
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According to Bertrand Russell, John Dewey was one of the prominent
representatives of the philosophical doctrine called ‘neutral monism’. In
his «An Outline of Philosophy» Russell writes the following:
Popular metaphysics divides the known world into mind and matter, and
a human being into soul and body. Some— the materialists — have said
that matter alone is real and mind is an illusion. Many— the idealists in
the technical sense, or mentalists, as Dr. Broad more appropriately calls
them— have taken the opposite view, that mind alone is real and matter
is an illusion. The view which I have suggested is that both mind and
matter are structures composed of a more primitive stuff which is neither
mental nor material. This view, called ‘neutral monism’, is suggested in
Mach’s «Analysis of Sensations», developed in William James’s Essays in
Radical Empiricism, and advocated by John Dewey, as well as by Professor
R.B. Perry and other American realists. The use of the word ‘neutral’ in
this way is due to Dr. H.M. Sheffer, of Harvard, who is one of the ablest
logicians of our time [21, p. 303].
So, according to Russell, John Dewey was one of the main proponents of
the ‘neutral monism’. But Russell is not the one who understands Dewey’s
ontology in this way. The same conclusion was, for example, recently made
by the contemporary philosopher Peter Godfrey-Smith, in his review of
Dewey’s magnum opus «Experience and Nature»:
Dewey chooses the term ‘emergentist’ for his view of the mind, though it
might be better to see this as a version of neutral monism, and a more
genuinely ‘neutral’ one than some other views described with that term.
Nature’s activities are not grounded in the physical any more than in the
mental. What we call the ‘physical’ or ‘material’ is part of what goes on;
what we call the ‘mental’ is another part [7, p. 5-6].
But, if, for example, to read the article on «Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy» on this topic [23], one can find no reference to Dewey as one
of the advocates of this theory at all. Thus, I think, there is a need of
the investigation in order to clarify Dewey’s relation towards this theory
too. In order to do this, I will briefly overview the positions of the ‘big
three’ of the neutral monism: Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand
Russell (in case of the latter, I will constrain my description only with his
understanding of what the very neutral monism is regarding the other two
of the ‘big three’). (According to Studenberg, «only Russell uses the label
‘neutral monism’. But there is a widespread agreement that Mach, James,
we don’t know what it’s like for it to process information from the phenomenal (or
phenomenological) point of view. We just have no epistemological access to its realm.
But nevertheless, it can surely mean that bat’s experience can go beyond what we now
consider as ‘mental’ or ‘physical’ altogether.
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and Russell are the three most important philosophers in this tradition»
[23]. Whether it is the case, we have to find out.)
But, at first, let’s begin with the definitions. Here, I think, there is a
strong need to distinguish between the ‘neutral monism’ and the ‘double-
aspect theory’. Though, «the decision about these types of theory —
whether they are incompatible rivals, whether they are distinct but
compatible, or whether they are identical — is still out» [23] and although,
they are mixed up and conflated3, we still have to try to keep the strong
and clear difference. Given that, one has to provide a clear reasoning in
order to eliminate the confusion between these philosophical enterprises.
On my understanding, neutral monism means that there is one common
reality, which, itself, is ‘neutral’, but which has two levels or properties, e.g.,
mental and physical, which are not reducible to this reality and the very
neutral reality cannot be explained through these non-neutral features
of it. So, these non-neutral features are, in a way, the products of the
neutral reality. «Grouped one way, the neutral entities that constitute your
brain are thoughts and feelings; grouped another way, they are atoms and
neurons and lobes» [23]. But, «the intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is
neither mental nor physical» [Ibid.]. And the very idea of neutrality is as
follows: «being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in nature ultimate
reality is said to be neutral between the two» [Ibid.].
Dual-aspect theory, on the other hand, is a theory which says that
there is one reality, but which is both mental and physical simultaneously,
and the conceiving of its ‘mentality’ or ‘physicality’ follows from the very
perspectives we are addressing this reality4. A very good example of dual-
aspect theory is presented by Spinoza in his Ethics. For Spinoza, there is
only one substance, which he calls God or Nature, which has an infinite
number of attributes (or aspects), of which, we can grasp only two: mind
and matter. So, God is simultaneously mind and matter altogether. That’s
3For example, Stephen Priest, in his book 1991 «Theories of the Mind», in the
chapter titled «Double Aspect Theory» [19, p. 150-182] writes about Spinoza as both
the originator of double-aspect theory and as well Russell’s neutral monism. In general,
Priest does not distinguish between two approaches.
4In this sense, I disagree with Studenberg’s definition of both doctrines. According
to him, «neutral monism and the dual-aspect theory share a central claim: there is an
underlying reality that is neither mental nor physical. But that is where the agreement
stops» [23]. I think that this is direct definition of neutral monism, but not of the dual-
aspect theory, because, if to accept such definition, there is no room for panpsychism in
case of the dual-aspect theory. Stephen Priest also confuses two theories: «the double
aspect theory is the theory that mental and physical are two types of properties of some
underlying reality which is intrinsically neither mental nor physical» [19, p. 150].
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why, Spinoza is considered as a panpsychist too.
At first, I will briefly explicate Russell’s position on ‘neutral monism’
through his views on the ‘predecessors’ (Mach, James) and will conclude,
whether Russell was right in his conclusions or the label of ‘neutral monism’
is solely based on his misunderstanding of the philosophers.
Afterwards, I will explicate Dewey’s position within this context and
find out, whether he can be fit into the list of ‘neutral monists’ (if there
are any) or not.
2 A Theory of Neutral Monism:
A Historical-Comparative Approach
2.1 Bertrand Russell
Bertrand Russell seems to be the first advocate of the label ‘neutral
monism’5: «of the three, only Russell uses the label ‘neutral monism’»
[23]. Thus, here, I will briefly describe Russell’s understanding of ‘neutral
monism’ as put in his famous 1914 essay on «The Nature of Acquaintance»,
relating its ‘originators’ such as James and Mach, as well as in his 1945
«History of The Western Philosophy». Despite the fact that there is a di-
fference in time and positions (in 1914, Russell was an opponent of this
theory, and beginning from 1919 — a proponent), as well as he developed
his own version of neutral monism, his common interpretation of its histori-
cal predecessors (and namely James, who influenced him in this manner)
didn’t change6.
In the essay «On the Nature of Acquaintance» [20], Russell provides
the following definition:
‘Neutral Monism’ — as opposed to idealistic monism and materialistic
monism— is the theory that the things commonly regarded as mental and
5According to Elizabeth Eames, «this term was used by James to name his particular
way of circumventing the body-mind problem in philosophy» [2, p. 198]. She appeals to
James’s 1905 essay «The Notion of Consciousness», which I briefly analyze below.
6As mentioned-above, I will omit the discussion of namely Russell’s theory of neutral
monism, which deserves some special attention in order to be fully described and
analyzed, because of its complexity and changes throughout his life (that’s why it was
even called as ‘Russelian monism’, instead of just ‘neutral’). But nevertheless, one can
get some common understanding of Russelian monism in Stephen Priest’s book «Theori-
es of the Mind» [19, p. 161-170]. (It seems, that for Priest ‘neutral monism’ and the
’double-aspect theories’ are identical, in that he describes Russell’s neutral monism in
the chapter called ‘Double-aspect theories’ [19, p. 151-182], where he mainly includes as
Spinoza, Russell and Strawson as the main representatives, though, he also mentions
David Hume and William James.)
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the things regarded as physical do not differ in respect of any intrinsic
property possessed by the one set and not by the other, but differ only in
respect of arrangement and context [20, p. 139].
For example, the postal directory, «where the same names come twice
over»: alphabetical (as, say, mental) and geographical (as, say, physical)
orders [Ibid.]. Or, «‘ideas’ of chairs and tables are identical with chairs
and tables, but are considered in their mental context, not in the context
of physics» [Ibib.]. Therefore, «the whole duality of mind and matter,
according to this theory, is a mistake; there is only one kind of stuff out of
which the world is made, and this stuff is called mental in one arrangement,
physical in the other» [Ibid., p. 140].
(As the originators of this theory, Russell names William James and
his «Essays in Radical Empiricism» (especially an essay «Does ‘Consci-
ousness’ Exist?») as well Ernst Mach and his 1886 book «Analysis of
the Sensations», whose theory «seems to be substantially the same as
James’s» [Ibid.]. Russell thinks that both of them developed this theory
independently of each other, and the only difference is that «Mach arrived
at his opinions through physics. James, whose opinions are essentially the
same, arrived at them through psychology» [Ibid., p. 141]7.)
Although, Russell quotes James’s mentioned-above essay in that «there
is no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which
material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made;
but there is a function of experience» [Ibid., p. 140, italics added]; as well as
the main James’s thesis that «there is only one primal stuff or material in
the world, a stuff of which everything is composed», which is itself a ‘pure
experience’ [Ibid., p. 141, italics added], Russell, from the very beginning,
emphatically puts the primary accent namely on that «stuff out of which
the world is made» [Ibid., p. 140], rather than that very ‘stuff’ is nothing
but ‘pure experience’. In my opinion, namely this was the wrong path
for the interpreting of James’s radical empiricism, and what already made
James’s ‘stuff’ as something ultimate and ‘neutral’, while ‘pure experience’
as something superfluous, derivative and which can be changed. (Later on,
in this essay, he’s critiquing James’s usage of experience from the idealistic
standpoint [Ibid., p. 145].)
Namely the same description of James’s radical empiricism as ‘neutral
monism’ was developed in Russell’s «History of Western Philosophy» [22,
p. 811-814]. Again, he cites James’s 1904 essay «Does ‘Consciousness’ Exi-
st?»: «no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which
7He also includes Ralph Barton Perry as the advocate of the same theory [20, p. 140].
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material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made»
[22, p. 812]. And that there is «‘only one primal stuff or material’ out of
which everything in the world is composed», and which James called ‘pure
experience’ («as the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to
our later reflection») [Ibid., p. 813]. But again, Russell emphatically points
to the ‘stuff’ rather than experience, as the main notion of James’s radical
empiricism:
It will be seen that this doctrine abolishes the distinction between mind
and matter, if regarded as a distinction between two different kinds of
what James calls ‘stuff’. Accordingly, those who agree with James in this
matter advocate what they call ‘neutral monism’, according to which the
material of which the world is constructed is neither mind nor matter, but
something anterior to both. James himself did not develop this implication
of his theory; on the contrary, his use of the phrase ‘pure experience’ points
to a perhaps unconscious Berkeleian idealism [Ibid., p. 814].
Russell continues to critique the notion of experience, until he concludes:
On common-sense grounds, therefore, we shall say that ‘experience’ is not
coextensive with the ‘stuff’ of the world. I do not myself see any valid
reason for departing from common sense on this point. Except in this
matter of ‘experience’, I find myself in agreement with James’s radical
empiricism [Ibid.].
On what it will be shown below, one can see that for James it’s impossi-
ble to divide between ‘stuff’ and ‘experience’, because the former is the
latter. They are identical.
2.2 Ernst Mach
Ernst Mach’s view on ‘neutral monism’ was explicated in his «Analysis
of Sensations» (1886). It is thought, Mach influenced James’s view on
radical empiricism, as well as Russell’s neutral monism8. Also, Mach is
considered to be the first of the ‘big three’ of the neutral monists. Thus, I
have to say a few words about his philosophical enterprise relating neutral
monism.
Mach’s ontology was considered largely through emphasis of ‘sensati-
ons’, which some understand as a solipsistic move [16, p. 1]. I, myself, do
not think it is the case. On my understanding, we have to start from the
different perspective, namely, experience. For Mach, experience is divided
into elements, namely (1) A, B, C . . . ; (2) K, L, M . . . ; and (3) α, β, γ . . . .
8According to Studenberg, «Ernst Mach (1838-1916) occupies a central position in
the history of neutral monism. He influenced William James and Bertrand Russell and,
through them, all of the writers on neutral monism in the English speaking world» [23].
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(1) The A, B, C . . . , cluster stands for the complexes of colors, sounds
etc., which we call bodies or ‘the world of matter’ [14, p. 8-9; 14-15];
(2) The K, L, M . . . ; cluster stands for own body [Ibid., p. 9];
(3) And finally, the α, β, γ . . . ; one denotes «the complex composed of
volitions, memory-images, and the rest», that is our mentality or
psyche [Ibid.].
Mach thinks of these elements as of the better substitutes of notions
like ‘body’ and ‘ego’, which «are only for provisional orientation and for
definite practical ends» [Ibid., p. 13] in order to deal with our experience
properly and to eliminate the antithesis between ‘world’, ‘ego’, ‘sensation’,
‘thing’, ‘body and spirit’ vanishes.
The main idea of the book is to show that there is «no real gulf between
the physical and the psychical» [Ibid., p. 71], all this very gulf is just the
result of «our habitual stereotyped conceptions» [Ibid., p. 17]. The psychi-
cal and physical are just functional relations between the elements. For
example, one of the main notions used by Mach in the book, sensations,
simply means out psychological9 relation of our body (K, L, M . . . ) to the
world (A, B, C . . . ). The world itself (A, B, C . . . ) is a not sensation. It
is the latter only in its particular functional relation to the body: «The
elements A, B, C . . . , therefore, are not only connected with one another,
but also with K, L, M. To this extent, and to this extent only, do we call
A, B, C. . . sensations, and regard A, B, C as belonging to the ego» [Ibid.,
p. 16].
At the same time, in other functional relation, these elements are what
we call ‘physical objects’. And Mach calls them ‘sensations’, because most
of people are used to perceive them as sensations (colors, sounds etc.)
[Ibid.]. And here, «the gap between what bodies and sensations [. . . ], what
is without and what is within, between the material world and the spiritual
world» vanishes, in that «all elements A, B, C . . . , K, L, M . . . , constitute
a single coherent mass, when any one element is disturbed, all is put in
motion» [Ibid., p. 17].
For us, everything (e.g., perceptions, presentations, volitions, and
emotions) «the whole inner and outer world» is composed of the «combi-
nations of varying evanescence and permanence, out of a small number of
homogeneous elements» [Ibid., p. 22]. «The primary fact is not the ego,
9One could even say phenomenological.
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but the elements (sensations)»10. «The elements constitute the I» [Ibid.,
p. 23].
Thus, there is «no opposition of physical and psychical, but simple
identity as regards these elements. In the sensory sphere of my consci-
ousness everything is at once physical and psychical»11 [Ibid., p. 44].
For Mach «the elements A, B, C . . . are immediately and indubitably
given [. . . ]» [Ibid., p. 45]. But how are they given? Phenomenologically
speaking, the world is given through sensations in their two-fold functional
meaning:
(1) Sensations as the result of the interconnection of one’s body (K, L,
M . . . ) with the world (A, B, C . . . );
(2) The very world (as physical object) perceived as the sensation in its
common-sense usage (colors, sounds, shapes etc.).
According to Mach, the guiding principle for studying sensations is
the «principle of the complete parallelism of the psychical and physical»
[Ibid., p. 60]. Mach wants to emphasize, that his view is not identical to
the «conception of the physical and psychical as two different aspects of
one and the same reality» [Ibid., p. 61]12.
10Which are given to us as sensations in that functional and common sense as menti-
oned-above.
11On the pages 44-45, one can see that Mach clearly identify sensations with the
field of psychology. But nevertheless, one can also see that simultaneously Mach treats
sensations in the phenomenological sense, namely, as the primary givenness of our
experience.
12On the pages 57-60 of his book, Mach introduces two principles, namely the princi-
ple of continuity and the principle of sufficient determination or sufficient differenti-
ation. These principles were developed by our intellect through adaptation and habit.
Simply put, the first one means «Wherever A appears, B is added in thought» [14,
p. 57]. The second principle means roughly the principle of association and determi-
nation: when A appears, it must be associated with B, or in this sense, A determines
B.
Thus, «the two things A and B being conceived as connected that to every change of
the one that can be observed at any moment there corresponds an appropriate change of
the other. It may happen that both A and B are conceived as complexes of components,
and that to every component of A a particular component of B corresponds» [Ibid.,
p. 58]. Mach goes on: «it is evident that the principle of continuity and that of sufficient
determination can be satisfied only on the condition [italics added] that with the same
B (this or that sensation) we always associate the same N (the same nerve-process)
and discover for every observable change of B a corresponding change of N. [. . . ] In a
word, for all psychically observable details of B we have to seek the correlated physical
details of N» [Ibid., p. 59]. Even when the hallucination is present, some certain nervous
process as the «essential and immediate condition of the sensation» must be the case.
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In the first place, our view has no metaphysical background, but corresponds
only to the generalized expression of experiences [italics added]. Again,
we refuse to distinguish two different aspects of an unknown tertium quid ;
the elements given in experience, whose connexion we are investigating,
are always the same, and are of only one nature, though they appear,
according to the nature of the connexion, at one moment as physical and
at another as psychical elements [Ibid., p. 61].
Thus, the ‘sensationalism’ of Mach is based on the ‘generalized expressi-
on of experiences’. Here, there is no place for the third ‘neutral’ common
reality, which gives rise to psychical and physical. The latter are the mani-
festations of the very experience as given in sensations13. Is there any place
for ‘neutrality’ in Mach’s ontological picture? Yes, there is. The world itself
(A, B, C . . . ) in its «all forms, colors, etc., are of like nature in themselves,
being in themselves neither psychical nor physical» [Ibid., p. 62].
Thus, the ontological picture of Mach’s philosophical doctrine is the
following:
(1) Experience, which consists of elements A, B, C . . . (the world of
matter), K, L, M . . . (our body), α, β, γ . . . (our mentality or psyche),
which are homogenous themselves, and phenomenologically are given
to us through sensations. The difference between psychical and physi-
cal lies in their functional (or perspective) relation to the elements.
(2) The world (A, B, C . . . ) as in itself is neutral14.
But (2) does not entail the common neutral reality, which gives rise
to different non-neutral aspects or properties (mental and physical). Thus,
Thus, «we cannot think of this immediate condition as being varied without conceiving
of the sensation of being varied, and vice versa» [Ibid., p. 60].
I would say that the ‘condition’ for the two principles of which Mach is talking about
in the above passage, reminds me of what in the Analytic philosophy of mind is be called
the notion of supervenience. This notion was introduced by Donald Davidson and it
goes like this «mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on
physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot
be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that
an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect»
[3, p. 214]. Simply put, «there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference» [15].
According to Jaegwon Kim, supervenience means the following relations: (1) Covari-
ance; (2) Dependence; (3) Nonreducibility [13].
13Compare with James: «But this present object, what is it in itself?» Of what stuff
is it made? Of the same stuff as the representation. It is made of sensations; it is
something perceived. Its esse is percipi, and object and representations are generically
homogeneous» [12, p. 264].
14As opposed to W. James view, according to whom the world in itself is experiential
for itself, which opens the door to the panpsychism (see below).
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Mach is neither a neutral monist, nor a solipsist. If it is a monism, then it is
an experience monism, as given in elements (which are phenomenologically
perceived as sensations).
2.3 William James
John Dewey, in his «Nature and Experience», clearly states:
We begin by noting that ‘experience’ is what James called a double-
barrelled word. [. . . ] It is ‘double-barrelled’ in that it recognizes in its pri-
mary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object,
but contains them both in an analyzed totality. ‘Thing’ and ‘thought’,
as James says in the same connection, are single-barrelled; they refer to
products discriminated by reflection out of primary experience [5, p. 10-
11].
Though, in the following footnote, Dewey, himself, says that doesn’t
intend «to attribute to James precisely the interpretation given in the
text» [Ibid., p. 11], from this, it is obvious, that namely William James was
the main influence on Dewey’s understanding of the notion of experience.
Here, Dewey refers to the very influential essay by James, called «Does
‘Consciousness’ Exist?» (1904). It was influential not only for Dewey’s
understanding of experience, but, played a very big role for Bertrand
Russell and the formation of his ‘neutral monism’ as we have seen before.
But, this is not the end of the story. James is considered to be one of the
‘big three’ of the ‘neutral monism’ theorists [23]. But the main question
is the following: is he? Here, I want to show that to consider James as
a ‘neutral monist’ is a big mistake. For this purpose, I will analyze his
two 1904 essays, namely «Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?», and «A World of
Pure Experience» as collected in «Essays in Radical Empiricism» (1912)
[10, 11].
In his «Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?» James introduces the notion of
‘radical empiricism’, which as according to Leopold Studenberg, is «the
view that has become the paradigm of neutral monism» [23]. And if it is
such, than the very concept of ‘neutral monism’ is in a big trouble.
James’s main idea in this essay is the following: there is «only one pri-
mal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed,
and if we call that stuff ‘pure experience’, then knowing can easily be
explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which
portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure
experience; one its ‘terms’ becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge,
the knower, the other becomes the object known» [10, p. 4-5]. In this essay,
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James wanted to show that there was no consciousness as a «special stuff
or way of being» [Ibid., p. 14] whatsoever. That it is just timeless «wi-
tness of happenings in time, in which it plays no part», being just «the
logical correlative of ‘content’ in an Experience of which a peculiarity is
that fact comes to light in it, that the awareness of content takes place»
[9, p. 5]. In this sense, self-consciousness means that when certain contents
are taking place, they «are not without witness as they occur» [Ibid.]. The
very existence of consciousness is reduced to being just an «epistemologi-
cal necessity, even if we had no direct evidence of its being there» [Ibid.].
Again, experience is not divided into consciousness and its content, they are
fundamentally the same. And it is namely in this context, James presents
his «double-barrelled» conception of experience. That is, fundamentally
our experience (or as James puts it ‘phenomenon’, ‘datum’, ‘Vorfindung’)
is double-aspect, only the definite perspective distinguishes whether it is
physical or mental: «does a given undivided portion of experience, taken
in one context of associates, play the part of a knower, of a state of mind,
of ‘consciousness’; while in a different context the same undivided bit of
experience plays the part of the thing known, of an objective ‘content.’ In
a word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing.
And, since it can figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right
to speak of it as subjective and objective both at once» [Ibid., p. 7]. Is it a
still dualism? Yes, it is. But it is not, as James puts it, ‘single-barrelled’, or
dualism of substances, but double-aspect one. It is dualism of aspects, or
perspectives of our experience. It means that one reality is «in two places
at once, both in outer space and a person’s mind» [Ibid., p. 8]. And, such
a dualism «instead of being mysterious and elusive, it becomes verifiable
and concrete. It is an affair of relations, it falls outside, not inside, the si-
ngle experience considered, and can always be particularized and defined»
[Ibid.].
Under subjective James understands what «experience represents», on
the other hand, objective is what is represented. And they are the same:
«no dualism of being represented and representing resides in the experience
per se». In pure experience, there is also no division of «consciousness and
what consciousness is ‘of’. Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional
attributes solely, realized only when the experience is ‘taken’, i.e., talked-
of, twice, considered along with its two differing contexts respectively, by a
new retrospective experience, of which that whole past complication now
forms the fresh content» [Ibid., p. 13].
But, what is the very ‘pure experience’? According to James, «for
the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality or existence, a simple
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that» [Ibid.]. The next sentence expresses the very turn: «In this naїve
immediacy it is of course valid ; it is there, we act upon it; and the doubli-
ng of it in retrospection [italics added] into a state of mind and a reali-
ty intended thereby, is just one of the acts [italics added]» [Ibid.]. From
this, it follows that what we are dealing with directly is this immediacy
of stream of experience, only which is afterwards divided into subjecti-
ve and objective. And this very division is the also the very act. Act of
our experience. And he goes on: «the immediate experience in its passi-
ng is always ‘truth’, practical truth, something to act upon, at its own
movement» [Ibid.]. The thing that James wants to express here, I would
call the ‘pragmatic phenomenology ’.
In this very essay, James already made an attack on what was later
called the ‘neutral monism’. On the page 14, he made an improvisational
Q and A, which cleared up the issue, whether the primal stuff, which he
called the ‘pure experience’ is neutral or not. So, here it is:
Q: If experience has not ‘conscious’ existence, if it be not partly made of
‘consciousness’, of what then is it made? Matter we know, and thought
we know, and conscious content we know, but neutral and simple ‘pure
experience’ is something we know not at all. Say what it consists of — for
it must consist of something — or be willing to give it up! [Ibid., p. 14].
A: To this challenge the reply is easy. Although for fluency’s sake I myself
spoke early in this article of a stuff of pure experience, I have now to say
that there is no general stuff of which experience at large is made. There
are as many stuffs as there are ‘natures’ in the things experienced. If you
ask what any one bit of pure experience is made of, the answer is always
the same: «It is made of that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity,
of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what not. [. . . ] Experience is only a
collective name for all these sensible natures, and save for time and space
(and, if you like, for ‘being’) there appears no universal element [italics
added] of which all things are made» [Ibid., p. 14-15].
It is also interesting that James did not think of ‘mental’ and ‘physi-
cal’ as fundamentally heterogeneous. For James, «their relations to ti-
me are identical», both have parts, complex and simple, as well as both
«can be compared, added and subtracted and arranged in serial orders»
[Ibid., p. 15]. And between mental and physical must be strong correlati-
on: «Of every extended object the adequate mental picture must have all
the extension of the object itself. The difference between objective and
subjective extension is one of relation to a context solely» [Ibid., p. 16].
And, of course, [. . . ] «thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff
as things are» [Ibid., p. 19], that is experience.
In his next 1904 essay, «A World of Pure Experience», James conti-
nues to develop his theory of ‘radical empiricism’, which he gave rise in
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his previous essay. He confesses, that ‘radical empiricism’ is not just a
philosophical theory, but his weltanschuung [11, p. 22]. «To be radical, an
empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is
not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is di-
rectly experienced» [Ibid.].
This essay helps understand the ontological question of experience. I
understand James’s ontology of experience in the threefold manner:
(1) The primary ontology. This is the experience in its pure, not reflected
state. Simply «plain, unqualified actuality or existence, a simple
that» [10, p. 13].
(2) The functional (or pragmatic) ontology. This is an example of the
reflected experience, or experience as given in retrospection, when
experience is «taken» [Ibid.]. From the point of view of the former
the world is as it is experienced. In this sense, it is ‘double-barrelled’
or that, which has two aspects: mental and physical. Though, the
very experience is not limited to these two15.
(3) The ontology of the Beyond. For James, «the beyond must of course
always in our philosophy be itself of an experiential nature [. . . ] it
must be an experience for itself whose relation to other things we
translate into the action of molecules, ether-waves, or whatever else
the physical symbols may be» [11, p. 43]. James confesses that «this
opens the chapter of the relations of radical empiricism to panpsychi-
sm [. . . ]» [Ibid.]. From this, it follows that James’s radical empiricism
is not of solipsistic nature, but rather of the panpsychistic.
So, that being said, if to put his philosophy into contemporary views,
James, locally speaking, is a double-aspect theorist of experience, and to
put things globally: a panpsychist. As one can see, the very experience is
in no way neutral.
15While reading the page 39 of «A World of Pure Experience», one can get the
impression that the very notion of experience is infinite: «If one and the same experience
can figure twice, once in a mental and once in a physical context (as I have tried, in my
article on Consciousness, to show that it can), one does not see why it might not figure
thrice, or four times, or any number of times, by running into as many different mental
contexts, just as the same point, lying at their intersection, can be continued into many
different lines. Abolishing any number of contexts would not destroy the experience itself
or its other contexts, any more than abolishing some of the point’s linear continuations
would destroy the others, or destroy the point itself». That passage reminds me the
definition of God as given by Spinoza in his Ethics: «By God I understand a being
absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinity of attributes, of which each
one expresses an eternal and infinite essence» [1, p. 85].
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2.4 The Case of Confusion
Nevertheless, there is some place in James’s radical empiricism, which
one can find rather confusing, rather than illuminative. In his 1905 essay,
«The Notion of Consciousness» [12], James, while talking about his ‘pri-
mal stuff’ writes the following: «let us suppose that primary reality is of
a neutral nature, and let us call it by some name also ambiguous, such a
phenomenon, datum, or Vorfindung» [Ibid., p. 268]. All this he now calls,
using the plural form as ‘pure experiences’ and proposes to call it monism
or ‘rudimentary monism’. But simultaneously, he wants us to distinguish
it from the classical «the so-called bilateral monism of scientific positivism
or that the Spinozists»16 [Ibid., p. 268-269].
Again, for James, the difference is that of ontology : classical duali-
sm distinguishes between two independent ontological realms (in case of
Descartes) and that of aspects (in case of Spinoza). But for James, the
difference between them is «of a FUNCTIONAL order only, and not at all
ontological as understood by classical dualism» [Ibid., p. 271].
Can we consider this ‘neutrality’ of experience as something in-between
the ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’, which are non-neutral entities? No, I don’t
think so. For James, experience is mental as well as physical simultaneously.
The very difference between the two is being distinguished only in reflecti-
on. So, given that, in what sense is experience ‘neutral’ then? I think,
that it is ‘neutral’ if we are only speaking in terms of ‘classical ontology’
(i.e., ‘experience’ is not purely idealistic (mental) and as well not purely
materialistic (physical). I think, here one would say it in the tautologi-
cal way: experience is experience), but it is in no way neutral in terms
of the ‘functional ontology’ or ‘pragmatic ontology’17. In other words, the
‘pure experience’ is only neutral to its classical predecessors (idealism and
materialism), but it’s not neutral to its mental and physical ‘barrells’, as
opposed to the contemporary understanding.
16Nevertheless, I do not see any fundamental difference between James and Spinoza in
this case. If one substitutes Spinoza’s ‘substance’ and ‘God’ with James’s ‘primal stuff’
and ‘pure experience’ respectively, one still can get an impression that their ontologies
are pretty much the same.
17As Eames puts it: «The position is called ‘neutral’ because, unlike other alternatives
to a body-mind dualism, it rejects the monism implicit in idealism, which explains body
in terms of mind, and the monism of materialism, which explains mind in terms of
body. In this sense, the position is neutral concerning mind and matter. James related
his theory to his particular form of ‘radical empiricism’ and to the leading-on character
of experience which is part of his pragmatism» [2, p. 198].
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3 Was John Dewey a Neutral Monist?
. . . experience is experience, or is
what it is [5, p. 191].
It is obvious that one of the main philosophical influences of Dewey
was that of William James and his theory of radical empiricism. Thus,
Dewey’s 1905 essay «The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism» [4, p. 115]
has a goal of clarification of the very notion of experience as postulated by
James earlier.
In this essay, Dewey identifies his philosophical position with radical
empiricism, pragmatism, humanism as well as introduces his own position
named as ‘immediate empiricism’. According to Dewey, «Immediate empi-
ricism postulates that things — anything, everything, in the ordinary or
non-technical use of the term ‘thing’ — are what they are experienced as»
[Ibid.]. «Things are what they are experienced to be» [Ibid., p. 116].
According to Dewey, the empiricist’s position can be understood in
terms of ‘as’ and ‘that’: «we may express his presupposition by saying that
things are what they are experienced as being; or that to a just account
of anything is to tell what that thing is experienced to be» [Ibid., p. 117].
Experience itself is always objective and determinate: «if any experience,
then a determinate experience; and this determinateness is the only, and
is the adequate, principle of control, or ‘objectivity’» [Ibid.]. And here,
one can already see Dewey’s answer against what later would be called
‘neutral monism’: «it is this thing, and some separate truth, that clamors
for its own reform» [Ibid., p. 118]. And it means that there is «no need
to search for some aboriginal that to which all successive experiences are
attached, and which is undergoing continuous change. Experience is always
of thats». Thus, when one is talking about experience, he means neither
that there is «some grandiose remote affair that is cast like a net around a
succession of fleeting experiences», nor «an indefinite total comprehensive
experience which somehow engirdles an endless flux». «Things are what
they are experienced to be» and «every experience is some thing» [Ibid.].
Dewey ends his essay with an interesting statement: «I do not mean by
immediate experience any aboriginal stuff out of which things are evolved».
All he means by it is the descriptive method as employed in natural sci-
ences, but with due respect to the subject investigated [Ibid., p. 119]. This
quote, I think, shows what distinguishes Dewey’s immediate empiricism
from James’s radical empiricism. In that, for James, as we have seen, ‘pure
experience’ is the very stuff out of which all the things are evolved (while
James denies that there is some general and neutral ‘stuff’ out which the
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very experience evolves), while for Dewey it is not the case. For the latter,
the ‘immediate experience’ is not such a primary stuff, but a ‘descriptive
method»’.
As to ontology ‘of the Beyond’ (if to use James’s phrase), Dewey states
that «there is nothing in the text that denies the existence of things
temporally prior to human experiencing of them». Because, it is «fairly
obvious that we experience most of the things as temporally prior to our
experiencing of them», but the very essence of Dewey’s intention here was
to show that «we are not entitled to draw philosophic (as distinct from
scientific) conclusions as to the meaning of prior temporal existence till
we have ascertained what it is to experience a thing as past» [Ibid., italics
added].
I think, when Russell in 1927 mentioned John Dewey among the list
of ‘neutral monists’, he meant his recent, as back to those days, book
«Experience and Nature» (1925 edition). Thus, one has to make a short
overview of this book written by Dewey, in order to clarify the things
in question better (i.e., the mind-body problem and the issue of ‘neutral
monism’)18.
Though, Dewey mentions in the very Introduction that the discussion
of the mind-body problem is centered in the VII Chapter of the book [5,
p. xiii], I think that the mind-body problem is one of the central topics of the
book in general. One can also see that the biggest enemies of Dewey are the
philosophers of the rationalist school, such as Descartes and Spinoza, as
well as early analytic philosophers, which are all called as ‘intellectualists’.
In the very introduction, Dewey already identifies the source of the
mind-body problem: «the isolation of nature and experience from each
other has rendered the undeniable connection of thought and effectiveness
of knowledge and purposive action, with the body, an insoluble mystery»;
as well as the solution: «the restoration of continuity» between the former
and the latter [Ibid.].
In Chapter 1 Dewey presents his understanding of the notions of experi-
ence and his own philosophic method. The latter is called as empirical
naturalism, naturalistic empiricism or naturalistic humanism [Ibid., p. 1].
The very essence of the empirical method is that «the things are to be
studied on their own account, so as to find out what is revealed when they
are experienced» [Ibid., p. 5].
18I am using the 1929 edition of «Experience and Nature». According to Dewey,
besides the rewriting the first chapter, the other parts of the book were influenced only
with «a few minor corrections» [5, p. xiii].
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As mentioned before, Dewey employs James’s understanding of experi-
ence as ‘double-barrelled’ [Ibid., p. 10]. From the very beginning, Dewey
speaks of experience as an emergent natural phenomenon: «no one with
an honest respect for scientific conclusions can deny that experience is
something that occurs only under highly specialized conditions, such as
found in a highly organized creature which in turn requires a specialized
environment» [Ibid., p. 3]. And though, he does not consider panpsychism:
«there is no evidence that experience occurs everywhere and everywhen»
[Ibid.]. For Dewey, it is a surely natural phenomenon: «experience is of as
well as in nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but nature —
stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on.
Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experi-
enced. Linked in certain ways with another natural object — the human
organism— they are how things are experienced as well. Experience thus
reaches down into nature; it has depth» [Ibid., p. 4].
Dewey understands experience in the two-fold manner:
(1) The primary experience «sets the problems and furnishes the first
data of reflection which constructs the secondary objects»;
(2) The reflective experience deals with the secondary objects and
«explain the primary objects», what itself «enables us to grasp
them with understanding, instead of just having sense-contact with
them». And that’s namely how the «test and verification» of (2)
through (1) takes place: i.e., «only by return to things of crude
or macroscopic experience — the sun, earth, plants and animals of
common, everyday life» [Ibid., p. 7].
But how does the very explanation and understanding occur? For
Dewey, it happens through meaning : «when the secondary objects, the
refined objects, are employed as a method or road for coming to at» the
qualitative objects of the primary experience, «these qualities cease to
be isolated details; they get the meaning contained in a whole system of
related objects; they are rendered continuous with the rest of nature and
take on the import of the things they are now seen to be continued wi-
th». This empirical method Dewey calls the denotative method [Ibid., p. 8].
Later on, it will be said: «Meaning is objective as well as universal. [. . . ] it
indicates a possible interaction, not a separate singleness» [Ibid., p. 156].
And namely that’s where the ‘intellectualists’ such as Descartes are
guilty: while relegating experience to «a secondary and almost accidental
place» [Ibid., p. 6], ‘intellectualism’ «meant the theory that all experiencing
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is a mode of knowing» and that all must be reduced and defined in terms
of «refined science as such» [Ibid., p. 21]. And this «goes contrary to the
facts of what is primarily experienced. For things are objects to be treated,
used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured, even more than things
to be known. They are things had before they are cognized» [Ibid.]. Thus,
a connection and continuity between primary and secondary experience is
lost, and the dualism of mind and matter is born.
In Chapter 2, Dewey points out that the very mistake of idealism and
materialism is that both of them approach their structures as something
static and unchangeable, fixed and absolute, while missing that they are
themselves subject to change. Structures themselves are functions, namely
the functions and characters of events, and «not something intrinsic and
per se» [Ibid., p. 62]. According to Dewey, «there is no action without
reaction». Whatever influences the changes of other things is itself changes
[Ibid., p. 63], and if structures of mental or physical would be something
fixed, they would be simply out of range of these principles [Ibid., p. 62].
That being said, Dewey critically approaches the notions of mind and
matter in their traditional usage: «the vague and mysterious properties
assigned to mind and matter, the very conceptions of mind and matter
in traditional thought, are ghost walking underground» [Ibid., p. 64]. In
order to properly deal with them, we have to understand that «natural
events are so complex and varied» that one can treat their characteristics
as something really different and opposite. Thus, «nothing but unfamili-
arity stands in the way of thinking of both mind and matter as different
characters of natural events» [Ibid.].
Nearly at the end of this Chapter, Dewey rejected the double-aspect
theory : «the idea that matter and mind are two sides or ‘aspects’ of the
same things, like the convex and the concave in a curve, is literally unthi-
nkable». And (what is crucial for our discussion) the neutral monism as
well: «that to which both mind and matter belong is the complex of events
that constitute nature. This becomes a tertium quid, incapable of designati-
on, only when mind and matter are taken to static structures instead of
functional characters». Because of this, Dewey also suggested that it would
be much better to try to use words like mind, consciousness, and matter
not as nouns, but as adjectives and adverbs: «conscious and consciously,
mental and mentally, material and physically». After this, «we would find
many of our problems much simplified» [Ibid., p. 64]. From this it clearly
follows, that Dewey is not a neutral monist.
What is the source and the possible solution of the mind-body problem
then? According to Dewey, «this entire discussion has but a single point.
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It aims to show that the problems which constitute modern epistemology
with its rival materialistic, spiritualistic, dualistic doctrines and rival reali-
stic, idealistic, representational theories; and rival doctrines of relation
of mind and matter, occasionalism, pre-established harmony, parallelism,
panpsychism, etc., have a single origin in the dogma which denies temporal
quality to reality as such» [Ibid., p. 124].
Dewey calls his own view on the mind-body relation as an ‘emergent
theory of mind’ [Ibid., p. 222]. Everything in nature is about interaction,
and «there is no isolated occurrence»: «interacting events have tighter
and looser ties, which qualify them with certain beginnings and endings,
and which mark off them from other fields of interaction» [Ibid.]. Dewey
distinguishes three plateaus of such interaction fields:
(1) The first one is physical. «It is the scene of narrower and more
external interactions, while qualitatively diversified in itself». Its
properties are «those of the mathematical-mechanical system di-
scovered by physics and define matter as a general character» [Ibid.].
(2) This one is about life: «qualitative differences, like those of plant and
animal, lower and higher animal forms, are here even more conspi-
cuous». It is the psycho-physical level.
(3) The last plateau is «that of association, communication and parti-
cipation». It consists of individualities. «It is marked through its
diversities, however, by common properties, which define mind and
intellect; possession of and response to meanings» [Ibid.].
Thus, «body-mind simply designates an affair with its own properties»
[Ibid., p. 232]. It «simply designates what actually takes place when a living
body is implicated in situations of discourse, communications and partici-
pation. [. . . ] ‘body’ designates the continued and conserved, the registered
and cumulative operation of factors continuous with the rest of nature,
inanimate as well as animate; while ‘mind’ designate the characters and
consequences which are differential, indicative of features which emerge
[italics added] when ‘body’ is engaged in a wider, more complex and
interdependent situation» [Ibid.].
Generally speaking, Dewey dedicates the whole book to the discussion
of the mind-body problem in this or that way. The very discussion is long
and complicated, but the very point is the following: in order to really deal
with the mind-body problem, one has to begin not from the conclusions
(i.e., with already formed metaphysical theories as they are now), but
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from the very premises: «the ‘solution’ of the problem of mind-body is
to be found in a revision of the preliminary assumptions about existence
which generate the problem» [Ibid., p. 215, 234]19.
4 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to understand what the concept of
‘neutral monism’ is and who can be considered as its proponent. The whole
meaning of this concept appeared to be really problematic and thus, at fi-
rst, I had to analyze the doctrines (and the description of neutral monism,
in case of Russell (as the creator of the very label)) of the ‘neutral moni-
sts’ before Dewey, in order to give the relevant historical and conceptual
context and afterwards, to clarify whether John Dewey himself fits into
this list. As it was shown, he does not.
But nevertheless, it also interestingly appeared that neither Ernst
Mach, nor William James (two of the ‘big three’ of neutral monism and its
‘creators’) cannot be considered as neutral monists as well. It also looks
like Bertrand Russell was the only ‘neutral monist’ among the analyzed
philosophers, as well as that, as it seems, it was Russell’s misunderstanding
of James’s radical empiricism or a deliberate putting different accents in
the latter’s theory that led Russell to creating his own original theory of
‘neutral monism’ (or it’s better to say the ‘Russelian monism’). Thus, I
think, the next interesting step would be to include into the discussion
the very Russelian monism, Ralph Perry’s philosophical heritage, as well
as that of the New Realists (all of them, as mentioned by Russell are
proponents of the ‘neutral monism’ too).
Also, Dewey’s understanding of the mind-body problem and its
treatment deserves another thorough investigation. Therefore, another
interesting step would be the analysis of this issue only. For now, it is
really hard to identify Dewey’s own position in this context. I think, he
19Here, I completely agree with Dewey. I, myself, think that in order to really deal
with the mind-body problem as postulated by Descartes, we have to analyze the very
means, the very how Descartes came up with his conclusions. And, in my opinion, this
Cartesian how is intuition (which can be called Scientia [17]). The same goes for Spinoza
(Scientia Intuitiva), and also for the contemporary philosophy of mind discussions: e.g.,
the knowledge argument, the zombie argument etc. All of them appeal to intuition as
the source for their arguments (which are made in the form of the thought experiments),
and that’s why all of them, can be called Cartesians: not from the point of view of their
final metaphysical conclusions, but from the point of the methodology. But the very
concept of intuition was not thoroughly analyzed and explicated in this context (i.e.,
the mind-body problem).
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can be classified with different names, but no one will truly characterize
him. Thus, I will leave this question open for now20.
But nevertheless, one thing here is pretty much obvious, and as such
is crucial for the very discussion in question: despite Russell’s (1927) and
Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (2013) mentioning Dewey as a proponent of neutral
monism, the latter was not a ‘neutral monist’ relating the mind-body
problem and cannot be considered as such. And namely that is, what I
wanted to clarify in this paper.
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Джон Дьюї та психофiзична проблема: на прикладi доктрини
«нейтрального монiзму»
Анотацiя. Головним фокусом статтi є психофiзична проблема на прикладi
доктрини ‘нейтрального монiзму’, а також, прояснення питання, хто може
вважатися її пропонентами. Згiдно з Бертраном Расселом, такими є Ернст
Мах, Вiльям Джеймс та Джон Дьюї (серед iнших). Стаття намагається
прояснити, чи сам Рассел був правий у своїх висновках чи нi. Спершу, я
прояснюю вiдношення мiж ‘нейтральним монiзмом’ та ‘двох-аспектною те-
орiєю’. По друге, я аналiзую ‘велику трiйку’ нейтрального монiзму: Мах,
Джеймс, Рассел. Моєю стартовою позицiєю є саме розумiння Расселом по-
зицiй Маха та Джеймса. Наостанок, виявляється, що анi Мах, Джеймс чи
Дьюї не можуть розглядатися як нейтральнi монiсти. Радше, нерозумiння
Расселом як радикального емпiризму Джеймса, так i аналiзу вiдчуттiв Ма-
ха спонукало його до створення власної оригiнальної версiї ‘нейтрального
монiзму’ (чи ‘монiзму Рассела’).
Ключовi слова: психофiзична проблема, нейтральний мо-
нiзм, двохаспектна теорiя, Рассел, Мах, Дьюї.
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